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THE ROLE OF SECTION 718.2(a)(ii) IN
SENTENCING FOR MALE INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Isabel Grant*
This article examines sentencing for male intimate partner violence against
women since the 1996 enactment of s 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code,
which requires that a spousal/common-law relationship between an offender
and victim be considered an aggravating factor in sentencing. The article
argues that, while in general appellate courts in Canada are taking this
violence seriously, cases involving level I sexual assaults still demonstrate the
longstanding tendency to treat the intimate relationship as mitigating. Further
appellate guidance is necessary on how courts should reconcile s 718.2(a)(ii)
with s 718.2(e), which requires that all options other than incarceration be
considered when sentencing an Indigenous offender. The author argues that
it is important for courts to at least consider the systemic problem of intimate
violence against Indigenous women when sentencing male offenders in these
cases.
Le pr~sent article examine la d~termination de la peine dans le contexte de
la violence conjugale faite aux femmes par les hommes depuis lhdoption,
en 1996, du sous-alina 718.2a)(ii) du Code criminel. Cet article oblige
le tribunal a tenir compte, a titre de circonstance aggravante dans le cadre
de la d~termination de la peine, de la relation conjugale qui existe entre le
dMlinquant et la victime. Liuteurefait valoir que m~me si, dans 1'ensemble, les
tribunaux dhppel canadiens prennent cette question de violence au sfrieux,
semble toujours persister la tendance de longue date a traiter la relation
conjugale comme tant un facteur att~nuant dans les affaires mettant en
cause des agressions sexuelles de niveau I . Par ailleurs, lhuteure souligne
qu'il faudrait de plus amples directives de la part des tribunaux dhppel
quant a lafa(on dont les tribunauxpeuvent concilier le libell du sous-alina
718.2a)(ii) avec celui de lhlina 718.2e), qui exige lexamen de toute sanction
substitutive a l'incarcration au moment de la dtermination de la peine de
dlinquants autochtones. L'auteure soutient qu'il est important que dans ces
affaires, les tribunaux tiennent compte, a tout le moins, du flau syst~mique
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quest la violence conjugalefaite auxfemmes autochtones, dans le cadre de la
dtermination de la peine des ddinquants de sexe masculin.
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1. Introduction
Male intimate partner violence against women has been described as "one
of the most universal and widespread forms of violence against women"1
While there is significant social science literature on the causes and responses
to such violence, very little academic work has focused on sentencing for
intimate partner violence in Canada.2 Section 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal
Code was enacted in 1996 in response to a growing recognition that violence
within intimate relationships was historically trivialized by the courts. 3
1 J Du Mont, D Parnis & T Forte, "Judicial Sentencing in Canadian Intimate Partner
Sexual Assault Cases" (2006) 25:1 Med & L 139 at 139 [Du Mont, Parnis & Forte, "Judicial
Sentencing in IPV Sexual Assault Cases"].
2 Diane Crocker does examine sentencing in her article, "Regulating Intimacy:
Judicial Discourse in Cases of Wife Assault (1970 to 2000)" (2005) 11:2 Violence Against
Women 197 [Crocker]. See also Statistics Canada, Cases in Adult Criminal Courts Involving
Intimate Partner Violence, by Pascale Beaupr6, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 8 July 2015) [Beaupr6]. Sentencing for intimate femicides has garnered more interest
in the legal literature. See e.g. Isabel Grant, "Intimate Femicide: A Study of Sentencing Trends
for Men Who Kill Their Intimate Partners" (2010) 47:3 Alta L Rev 779; Myrna Dawson,
"Punishing Femicide: Criminal Justice Responses to the Killing of Women Over Four
Decades" (2016) 64:7 Current Sociology 996.
3 RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code].
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Section 718.2(a)(ii) provides that it is now a mandatory aggravating factor
in sentencing if the offender was in a spousal or common-law relationship
with the victim at the time of the offence.
This paper examines the impact of this provision through an analysis of
all appellate decisions that have cited s 718.2 (a) (ii) between its enactment in
1996 and the end of 2016. The goal of this paper is to shed light on where we
are in sentencing for intimate violence and whether s 718.2(a)(ii) has made
a difference. The case law review demonstrates that, in general, appellate
courts are taking violence within intimate relationships seriously. Non-
custodial sentences are no longer the norm and appellate courts have shown
a willingness to overturn such sentences on Crown appeals. This paper
will outline two areas where guidance is needed from the appellate courts.
First, courts have struggled to reconcile s 718.2(a)(ii) when it applies in the
context of an Indigenous offender. Courts are understandably more cautious
about imposing custodial sentences on Indigenous offenders because of the
over-incarceration of Indigenous persons in Canada. However, with a few
notable exceptions, s 718.2(a)(ii) tends to fade in significance in these cases
and courts only occasionally recognize the serious problem of violence
against Indigenous women. Second, the sexual assault cases stand out as
continuing to perpetuate the idea that the intimate relationship is mitigating
and that being sexually assaulted by an intimate partner is less harmful to
women than being sexually assaulted by a stranger. In these cases, we see
remnants of the view that a man cannot rape his wife and that, if a woman
had really been sexually assaulted, she would have left the relationship
immediately. This is particularly striking when one remembers that, in all of
these cases, non-consent will already have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by the Crown or admitted by the accused through a guilty plea. The
more egregious problems in these cases were evident in the trial decisions
underlying the appeals. Appellate courts did use s 718.2(a)(ii) to increase
the sentences in several of these cases. However, remnants of the idea that
sexual assault in an intimate relationship is somehow less damaging to
women are still evident in some appellate sentencing decisions.
The study began as an examination of the role of s 718.2(a)(ii) in
sentencing for intimate partner violence generally.4 However because such
a large majority of the cases under study (94%) involved male offenders
4 This paper emerged out of a larger study done for the Department of Justice on the
impact of s 718.2(a)(ii) on sentencing for intimate violence: Canada, Department of Justice,
Sentencinq for Intimate Partner Violence in Canada: Has s.718.2(a)(ii) Made a Difference?,
Isabel Grant (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2017) [Grant, "Sentencing for IPV"] (a copy
of the report may be requested online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/index.html>).
For a summary of the report see Isabel Grant, "S for Intimate Partner Violence n
Canada: Has s. 718.2(a)(ii) Made A Difterence?" (2017) 10 Victims of Crime Research Digest,
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rdlO-rrlO/p2.html>. The original
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engaging in violence against female victims, this paper uses the language
of male intimate partner violence against women ("MIPVW"), in order
to acknowledge the gendered nature of these cases, and intimate partner
violence ("IPV") when referring to gender-neutral statistics or legislative
provisions. This paper focuses on appellate decisions for a number of
reasons. First, we look to appellate courts to set ranges and starting points
for trial courts in sentencing and to provide guidance on how to approach
such cases. It is the job of appellate courts to bring some consistency to
trial courts in sentencing. Second, the reasons in the trial level sentencing
decisions citing s 718.2(a)(ii) were often brief and only made passing
reference to s 718.2(a)(ii), and thus did not lend themselves to general
observations. Finally, appellate cases often highlight the most egregious
trial decisions that may not be widely available otherwise. For these reasons,
and to obtain a manageable sample, appellate cases are the primary focus of
this paper, but trial decisions will be referred to where relevant to the issues
under discussion.
A) Background
Cases involving IPV constitute a majority of completed cases involving
violence in Canadian courts with almost 335,000 completed cases between
2005/2006 and 2010/2011.5 Male violence against women accounts for 85%
of these cases,6 and 98% of intimate partner sexual assaults involve male
offenders and female victims. 7 Female victims are twice as likely as male
victims to be injured8 and charges are more likely to be laid where the victim
is female.9
Historically, MIPVW has been seen as less serious than violence against
strangers and characterized as something that is private within the family
study examined trial decisions as well as appeal decisions, but the focus of the present paper
is on appeals.
5 Beaupr6, supra note 2 at 6.
6 Ibid at 3.
7 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada:A Statistical Profile 2002, by Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue No 85-224-XIE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, June 2002)
at 6. See also Angela Cameron, "Sentencing Circles and Intimate Violence: A Canadian
Feminist Perspective" (2006) 18:2 CJWL 479 at 492 93 [Cameron]; Jane Dickson-Gilmore,
"Whither Restorativeness? Restorative Justice and the Challenge of Intimate Violence in
Aboriginal Communities" (2014) 56:4 Can J Crim & Corr 417 at 420 22 [Dickson-Gilmore]
(describing male intimate partner violence against Indigenous women in particular).
8 Statistics Canada, Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends, edited by
Maire Sinha, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 25 February 2013) at 9.
9 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2010, by Maire
Sinha, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 22 May 2012) at 5.
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and therefore not the legitimate subject of public, or judicial, concern.10
In the early case law, judges prioritized keeping relationships together
even where repeated violence was involved, and characterized one of the
primary goals of sentencing as "to facilitate, and certainly not impede,
the reconciliation of the spouses" 11 If a woman was unable to leave the
relationship, or chose not to, or if she expressed forgiveness towards her
abuser, it was often considered a mitigating factor in sentencing. 12 Judges
deliberately imposed lenient sentences to minimize the impact of the
violence on the "sanctity" of the family.13 Very little concern was shown in
these cases for the safety of the women involved. Non-custodial sentences
and very short terms of imprisonment were prevalent in the early cases. In
her literature review, Diane Crocker demonstrated that many courts were
reluctant to incarcerate men for MIPVW and that, when incarceration was
imposed, it was often for a term of 30 days or less. 14 A 1994 Nova Scotia
study that tracked 1,157 cases of "family violence" over a six-month period,
of which 929 were spousal violence, found that only 28.4% of offenders
were sentenced to incarceration, while the remaining 71.6% received non-
custodial sentences. 15 Approximately half of those receiving custodial
10 See e.g. R v Deschamps, 1989 CarswellOnt 2922 (WL Can) at para 24, [1989]
OJ No 936 (QL) (Dist Ct) (where a conditional discharge was given in part because
the offence was committed privately in front of the family only). On the public/private
distinction see Frances Olsen, "Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/
Private Distinction" (1993) 10:2 Const Commentary 319; Catherine Moore, "Women
and Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy in International Law" (2003)
7:4 Intl JHR 93; Jennifer Koshan, "Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy,
Violence, and Aboriginal Women" in Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private
Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 87.
11 R v Chaisson (1975), 11 NSR (2d) 170 at para 14, 3 CR (3d) S-17 (SC (AD)). For a
discussion of these early cases see Timothy AO Endicott, "The Criminality of Wife Assault"
(1987) 45:2 UT Fac L Rev 355 [Endicott].
12 R v Butler, 34 Sask R 292, 1984 CanLII 2542 (CA).
13 Endicott, supra note 11, citing R v Goose, [1984] NWTR 56, 1983 CarswellNWT
35 (WL Can) (Terr Ct) (where the trial judge, after stating that marriage is not a license to
beat up one's wife, imposes a fine of $1,000 for doing so because he was concerned that a
lengthy term of imprisonment would negatively impact the offender's marriage and that he
might blame his wife for the imprisonment).
14 Crocker, supra note 2 at 199; Nova Scotia, Solicitor General Canada & Nova Scotia
Department of Justice, The Response of the Justice System to Family Violence in Nova Scotia: A
Report of the Nova Scotia Family Violence Tracking Project, November 1994 (Halifax: Solicitor
General Canada and Nova Scotia Department of Justice, 1995) at 191 [The Response of the
Justice System to Family Violence].
15 The Response of the Justice System to Family Violence, supra note 14 at 187 88: The
71.6% figure was reached by subtracting the percentage of offenders who received custodial
sentences from the total sample. While 28.4% of offenders were sentenced to incarceration,
82.2% of offenders were given probation, 20.8% were fined, 0.5% received an absolute
discharge, 5.6% were given a conditional discharge and 28.0% were given a suspended
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sentences received sentences of 30 days or less. 16 Thirteen percent were
sentenced to only "one day", which could be served by attending court.17
The most common sentence imposed was probation. 18 The trivialization
of intimate violence is starkly exemplified in a 1986 case, where the trial
judge imposed a condition (of a suspended sentence) that the offender buy
his wife a gift worth at least $50, a condition that was upheld by the Prince
Edward Island Court of Appeal on a Crown appeal. 19
By the late 1980s, however, some appellate courts were beginning
to recognize that violence against women was even more serious when
committed by an intimate partner precisely because it often takes place in the
home away from public scrutiny, is often ongoing, and involves a significant
breach of trust.20 The enactment of s 718.2(a)(ii) in 1996 represented a
landmark recognition by Parliament that the intimate relationship is an
aggravating factor in sentencing.21 Judges were now mandated to treat
violence in intimate relationships as particularly serious.
B) Scope of Section 718.2(a)(ii)
When s 718.2(a)(ii) was introduced in 1996, it only covered crimes against
spouses (and children) of the offender. In 2000, common-law partners were
added to the section22 as part of wider omnibus legislation designed to end
sentence. These numbers do not add up to 100% because some offenders received more than
one type of sentence; for example, imprisonment and probation.
16 Ibid at 191.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid at 188.
19 R v Acorn (1986), 57 Nfld & PEIR 270, 170 APR 270 (SC (AD)). A New Zealand
study suggests that even in 2014 there may still be a discount for intimate violence as
compared to violence outside of a relationship. Bond and Jeffries found that domestic
violence offenders were less likely to be sentenced to incarceration as compared to those
committing similar offences outside of an intimate relationship and, of those imprisoned,
those committing intimate violence were sentenced to shorter terms. That study also found
that older Indigenous men tended to be sentenced particularly harshly. Christine E W Bond
& Samantha Jeffries, "Similar Punishment?: Comparing Sentencing Outcomes in Domestic
and Non-Domestic Violence Cases" (2014) 54:5 Brit J Crim 849 at 849.
2o See e.g. R v Stanley, [1986] BCJ No 695 (QL), 1986 CarswellBC 1264 (WL Can)
(CA); R vJulian (1990), 1990 CarswellBC 1286 (WL Can), [1990] BCJ No 2775 (QL) (CA); R
vInwood (1989), 48 CCC (3d) 173, 69 CR (3d) 181 (Ont SC (CA)); R vBrown, 1992 ABCA
132, 125 AR 150.
21 Section 718.2(a) (ii) of the Code, supra note 3, was enacted in 1995 under An Act
to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing), and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, SC 1995,
c 22, s 6. This legislation was given Royal Assent on July 13, 1995 and came into force on
September 3, 1996.
22 Bill C-23, Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, 36th Parl, 2nd Sess, 2000,
c 12, s 94(c).
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discrimination against same-sex partners. 23 "Common-law partner" is
defined in s 2 of the Code as "a person who is cohabiting with the individual
in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one
year."24 Children were removed from s 718.2(a)(ii) in 2005,25 and a new
aggravating factor (s 718.2(a)(ii.1)) was added, dealing exclusively with the
abuse of a person under the age of 18. Section 718.2(a)(ii), which now reads:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following
principles:
a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant
aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender,
and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the
offender's spouse or common-law partner
26
The drafting of this section still raises some uncertainty with respect to
its scope. A narrow reading of the section would suggest that only current
spouses and common-law partners are included, and that victims who are
former partners or non- cohabiting partners are not. How the courts interpret
these questions and what scope they give to the section will inevitably have
a significant impact on its effectiveness. In general, the courts have been
willing to apply the section to former spouses/common-law partners, or
to apply an equivalent common law aggravating factor recognizing the
heightened risk women face when they try to extricate themselves from a
violent relationship 27 and the degree to which the purpose of s 718.2(a)(ii)
23 House of Commons Debates, 36th Par, 2nd Sess vol 136, no 85 (15 February 2000),
online: <http://www.lipad.ca/full/2000/02/15/10/#4142566>. However, it is notable that only
one case in the present sample included violence against a same-sex partner.
24 Code, supra note 3.
25 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Protection of Children and Other Vulnerable
Persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 2005, c 32.
26 Code, supra note 3. Since this paper went to press, the government has introduced
Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts
and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018 (first reading
29 March 2018) [Bill C-75], which would replace the words "spouse or common-law partner"
in s 718.2(a) (ii) with "intimate partner", which in turn would be defined as including dating
relationships and as extending to former intimate partners.
27 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2014, by
Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
21 January 2016) [Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada, 2014] at 6 ("[m]ore victims
self-reported spousal violence in former relationships than in current unions").
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would be undermined by rejecting its application to former spouses. Many
cases apply s 718.2(a)(ii) to former spouses without any discussion of
whether the section covers former partners; rather, it is simply assumed.28
Others discuss the issue explicitly, although sometimes it is not entirely clear
whether the section is being applied or whether the same principle is being
applied as a common law aggravating factor.29 Judges talk about a former
spouse being similar to the relationship in s 718.2(a)(ii), and therefore
conclude that the intimate relationship is aggravating without specifying the
source of the aggravating factor.30
However, there is more disagreement with respect to whether the
section applies to non-cohabiting couples, with courts in Newfoundland and
Labrador holding explicitly that it does not. In R v Squires, the Newfoundland
and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the section is directed to the
vulnerability and dependency that is "presumed to arise from [a] domestic
relationship."31 It is that dependency that makes it particularly difficult for a
woman to extricate herself from a relationship. Such is not the case where no
domestic relationship exists. 32 This approach fails to recognize the dangers of
intimate violence in non-cohabiting relationships. The Squires approach has
led at least one trial judge to conclude that the vulnerability and dependency
analysis is a prerequisite for applying the section even where spouses are
actually living together.33 Other appellate courts that have considered the
issue have not followed the Squires approach. The Alberta Court of Appeal
has taken the position that this provision extends to non-cohabiting intimate
28 See e.g. R v Khamphila, 39 WCB (2d) 307, 1998 CarswellOnt 3250 (WL Can) (Ct
J (Gen Div)); R v Wood, 2007 BCPC 257, 2007 CarswellBC 1862 (WL Can); R v Good, 2012
YKCA 2, [2012] 2 CNLR 204 [Good]; R v OFB, 2006 ABCA 207, 391 AR 215; R v Lausberg,
2013 ABCA 72, 544 AR 56; R v MacDonald, 2012 BCCA 155, 320 BCAC 51 [MacDonald
BCCA].
29 The most frequently cited case on this issue is R c Cook, 2009 QCCA 2423, 71 CR
(6th) 369, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2010] SCCA No 112. For cases relying on this
decision see e.g. R c Rancourt, 2016 QCCQ 9169, 2016 CarswellQue 8746 (WL Can); R c JP,
2014 QCCQ 6098, 2014 CarswellQue 7257 (WL Can); R c Gravel, 2014 QCCQ 10611, JE
2014-2065; R c ND, 2011 QCCS 4945, JE 2011-1872; R v Dyck, 2014 SKCA 93, 442 Sask R
209; R v Glennie, 2010 SKPC 22, 357 Sask R 58.
30 R v Cuthbert, 2007 BCCA 585, 54 CR (6th) 99 [Cuthbert]; R v Pakoo, 2004 MBCA
157, [2005] 9 WWR 414 [Pakoo].
31 2012 NLCA 20 at para 31, 320 Nfld & PEIR 39 [Squires].
32 ibid.
33 In R v Gilley (2013), 234 Nfld & PEIR 307 at para 14, 1037 APR 307, Gorman J
refused to apply s 718.2(a)(ii) to the relationship in question because "[a] s in Squires, there
was no evidence presented here that Mr. Gilley's relationship with Ms. Whillans 'engaged the
kind of vulnerability or dependency associated with a spousal relationship." This requirement
should not have been necessary since the couple did live together.
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partners. 34 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R v Woods applied the
section to a couple that had been living together for less than two months
in a "short-lived and not particularly conventional" relationship 35 and, in
R v Ochusthayoo,36 to a non-cohabiting intimate relationship without any
discussion of this issue.
The final issue around the scope of s 718.2(a)(ii) is whether it extends
to crimes that are committed against a third party because of that person's
relationship to a (former) spouse/common-law partner. It is not uncommon
to see a new partner or another family member targeted for violence in
addition to, or instead of, the former intimate partner. Targeting a new
partner or other loved one of a former partner is a mechanism used to
control the partner's behaviour or to deter her from leaving a relationship or
from starting a new one. In the five appellate cases citing s 718.2(a) (ii) where
a new partner/boyfriend was included as a victim, 37 the former spouse/
partner was also a victim of violence and the courts did not differentiate
between the two victims or discuss whether or not the section applied to
the new partner only. There are no appellate cases where a court has applied
the section where the only victim is a new partner or other family member.
In fact, courts sometimes fail even to acknowledge the domestic violence
nature of a crime where only a new boyfriend is targeted. For example, in R
v McCowan, the offender scaled the outside of his wife's apartment building,
broke into her bedroom and committed aggravated assault against his wife's
new boyfriend.38 The majority of the Court of Appeal did not mention
domestic violence, let alone cite the section, even though the wife was in
bed with the victim at the time of the attack.39
34 Seee.g.RvEvans, 1997ABCA 165,196AR207 (wheretheCourtheldthatitwaswrong
to exclude former intimate partners in the scope of domestic violence sentencing guidelines);
R v Lee, 2004 ABCA 46, 346 AR 195 (where the Court relied on Evans to stress the need to
deter intimate violence after the breakup of the accused and his former girlfriend, although not
mentioning s 718.2(a)(ii)); R v Coulthard, 2005 ABCA 413, 384 AR 353 [Coulthard] (where
the Court took for granted that s 718.2(a) (ii) applied to a dating relationship); R v Wenc, 2009
ABCA 328, 460 AR 366 [Wenc] (where the Court extended this decision to apply to a former
same-sex relationship even though it was not dear whether the couple had ever lived together).
35 2008 SKCA 40 at paras 1, 38, 310 Sask R 16 [Woods].
36 2004 SKCA 16, 241 Sask R 284; see also the trial decision in R c Regis-Fod, 2015
QCCQ 8160,2015 CarswellQue 8968 (WL Can).
37 R v Morris, 2004 BCCA 305, 186 CCC (3d) 549 [Morris]; Pakoo, supra note 30;
Cuthbert, supra note 30; MacDonald BCCA, supra note 28; R v Wesslen, 2015 ABCA 74, 599
AR 159.
38 2010 MBCA 45 at para 4, [2010] 7 WWR 195. See also R v McNeil, 1998 NSCA
95, 125 CCC (3d) 71 (where the offender had been convicted of the manslaughter of his
wifes new partner; assaulted his wife in the process of killing the new partner; and where the
domestic violence nature of the offence was noted but s 718.2(a)(ii) was not mentioned).
39 In R c Bosse, 2015 QCCQ 6652, 2015 CarswellQue 7484 (WL Can), the offender
was convicted of a number of offences related to a home invasion after targeting a particular
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It may not appear to make much practical difference whether courts
apply s 718.2(a)(ii) or some equivalent common law aggravating factor
to former intimate partners and non-cohabiting partners. However,
s 718.2(a)(ii) is mandatory. Failure to address the section is therefore always
a reviewable error, whereas with non-mandatory aggravating factors, a
sentencing judge may have more discretion. Section 718.2(a)(ii) makes
an important statement about the law's approach to such violence. What
is included within the section, and what is not, matters. Thus, it would be
helpful to amend the section to give it a broader and clearer scope. Violence
within any (former) intimate relationship should be aggravating, and it is
also important to include new partners and third parties within s 718.2(a) (ii)
because courts often fail to see this as a form of MIPVW, even though these
victims are targeted to hurt and control the female intimate partner.
2. The Cases Under Study
This study focuses on the 82 appellate cases that cite s 718.2(a)(ii) from
1996 to 2016. A number of additional MIPVW cases not referencing the
section are also mentioned where relevant to issues being discussed. It is
important to acknowledge that sentencing decisions provide a narrow lens
through which to examine criminal justice responses to MIPVW, because
only cases where a prosecution has ended in a conviction will be included.
This paper does not include cases that have been deemed unfounded by
police, where charges have been dropped, or where problematic acquittals
have been entered.
A) Brief Overview of the Cases
The vast majority of the 82 offenders in the appeal cases were male, with a
total of 79 men (96%) and three women (4%).4o Seventy-eight (94%) of the
cases involved male violence against (former) female intimate partners and
one case involved a male same-sex couple.4 1 All of the offences committed
home because he wrongly suspected his pregnant ex-girlfriend and her new partner were in
the house that night. The trial judge applied s 718.2(a) (ii) because the offence was motivated
by domestic violence even though the victims did not include either the ex-girlfriend or her
new partner. Bill C-75, supra note 26, would include intimate partners within s 718.2(a)(ii),
which is defined as including dating relationships and former partners. Third parties who
are targeted because of their relationship to an intimate partner remain outside the scope of
the section.
40 For cases involving female offenders, see Good, supra note 28; R c Zugravescu, 2015
QCCA 914, JE 2015-984; R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue].
41 Wenc, supra note 34. The original study also looked at 71 trial decisions citing s
718.2(a) (ii) and 122 appellate cases about MIPVW that did not cite the section. These cases
had a very similar distribution of male and female offenders and victims. None of these cases
involved same-sex violence.
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by women involved male victims. At least one of the female offenders had
also been subject to repeated abuse by her male partner, thus also implicating
MIPVW.42 Assault-based offences are the most common charges found in
the sample with 76 cases (93%) including some level of assault conviction
and 17 cases (21 %) including convictions for some level of sexual assault.43
Indigenous offenders were overrepresented in this sample of cases.
Eleven, or 13%, of the offenders in the sample of appellate cases citing
the section were Indigenous, including two of the three female offenders.
The intersection of s 718.2(a)(ii) and s 718.2(e) is complex and, as will
be discussed below, s 718.2(a)(ii) tends to recede in significance where
s 718.2(e) is involved.
There were 26 first offenders (32%) and 26 offenders (32%) who had
records for domestic violence, including 17 offenders (21%) for violence
against the same victim. The rest of the offenders had a record for unrelated
offences. Even where the offender was a first offender, some cases involved
abuse that took place over a significant period of time but had only recently
come to police attention. In about one quarter of cases, the offender was
subject to some court order at the time of the offence, including almost 20%
of cases where the offender was on a no-contact order with respect to the
ultimate victim.
Alcohol played a prominent role in these cases, with judges referring
to the offender's intoxication in 29 (35%) of the cases. judges often assume
a causal relationship between alcohol consumption and violence such that
if one could only stop the offender from drinking, the violence would stop.
In fact, the relationship between alcohol and MIPVW is more complex
and may not be a causal one. Canadian research by Holly Johnson suggests
that the relationship is mediated by other factors such as male attitudes
towards women. In her study, Johnson found that "[t]he acting-out of
negative attitudes towards women, especially men's rights to degrade and
devalue their female partners through name-calling and putdowns, was an
especially important predictor [of violence] and ... reduced the effects of
alcohol abuse to nonsignificance."44
Thirty-one (38%) of the appeals in this paper were brought by the
Crown. Crown appeals of sentence in these cases had a much higher success
42 Gladue, supra note 40.
43 This finding is consistent with other studies. See e.g. Crocker, supra note 2 at 203,
Table 1.
44 Holly Johnson, "Contrasting Views of the Role of Alcohol in Cases of Wife
Assault" (2001) 16:1 J Interpersonal Violence 54 at 68. Johnson uses these findings to argue
"that young men look to alcohol and control and violence against women as resources to
enhance masculine status" at 69.
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rate (77%) than those brought by the defence (23%). Considering all 82
appellate cases, the Crown was successful in 62 cases (76%). This is probably
a slightly low estimate given that some successful defence appeals involved
only a change in the amount of credit given for pretrial custody after the
decision in R v Summers.45 These findings are particularly striking given the
deference appellate courts give to trial courts in sentencing,46 particularly
where the appeal is brought by the Crown.47 Assuming that the Crown only
appeals the most egregious sentences, one might expect that these cases will
reveal the most problematic analyses of sentencing at the trial level. The
high rate of successful Crown appeals raises the possibility that, despite the
trend towards deference, overly lenient sentences are being corrected on
appeal, indicating that some trial courts continue to fail to acknowledge the
seriousness of these offences.
B) Sentences Imposed
One must be cautious comparing groups of cases where the seriousness
of the offences charged and circumstances of the offender cannot be
adequately controlled. Changes in the availability of conditional- sentence
orders ("CSOs") over the time period under study also complicate the
picture. Nonetheless, attempting to quantify these sentences demonstrates
that, overall, significant periods of incarceration are often being imposed for
MIPVW at the appellate level. The sentences that are presented below reflect
the sentence imposed before pretrial custody has been taken into account in
order to provide some consistency.
The high rate of federal incarceration (59%) is the most striking finding
with an additional 30% serving provincial time including three offenders
sentenced to intermittent sentences. As will be discussed below, appellate
courts in several cases jumped from non-custodial sentences imposed at
trial to penitentiary time on appeal. There was an increase over time in the
proportion of cases leading to federal sentences. For example, between 2003
and 2009, 47% of cases involved federal time whereas between 2010 and
2016, 67% of cases resulted in federal time, which suggests that the impact
of s 718.2(a)(ii) may have increased over time. While appellate decisions
cannot be directly compared to what is happening at first instance, this is
nonetheless a significant trend.
45 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 SCR 575.
46 See R v Shropshire, [1995] 4 SCR 227, 129 DLR (4th) 657.
47 See R v DJS, 2015 BCCA 111,370 BCAC 57.
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Table 1: Sentences Imposed Over Time
1996-2002 2003-2009 2010-2016 Total
N= 14 N= 32 N= 36
Discharge (absolute or 0 0 0 0
conditional)
Suspended Sentence with 0 1 (3%) 2 (6%) 3 (4%)
Probation
CSO 2 (14%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 5 (6%)
Intermittent Sentence 0 1 (3%) 2 (6%) 3 (4%)
Provincial Time (without 0 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 2 (2%)
probation)
Provincial Time (with 3 (21%) 11 (34%) 6 (17%) 20 (24%)
probation)
Federal Time 8 (57%) 15 (47%) 22 (61%) 45 (55%)
Federal Time* + Long Term 1 (7%) 0 2 (6%) 3 (4%)
Supervision Order
Sentence Unknown 0 1 (3%) 0 1 (1%)
Total 14 32 36 82
* Federal time refers to a sentence of two years or more.
An examination of the distribution of sentences between non-custodial,
provincial and federal time shows some small differences between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders, which will be discussed in more
detail below in Part 3.48
Chart 1: Sentencing Comparison: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous
Offenders by type of sentence
t Q ... .. ..... .. ... .. ..... .. ... .. . ... ... . .. .. ..... .. ... .. .. .. ..... .. . .... ..
48 It should be noted that the same trend was not evident in the trial cases that were
examined in the original study. In the trial cases, Indigenous offenders were more likely to
get federal time and less likely to receive non-custodial sentences, suggesting that appellate
courts maybe giving more weight to Gladue factors than trial courts: Grant, "Sentencing for
IPV", supra note 4 at 15.
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3. Analysis of Section 718.2(a)(ii) Case Law
A) Non-Custodial Sentences
No area has been more controversial in sentencing for MIPVW than the
overuse of non-custodial sentences. Such sentences have been seen as a
reflection of the trivialization of MIPVW and a failure to acknowledge the
danger to women from these offences. The appropriateness of non-custodial
sentences is still a live issue given that almost one quarter of the cases in this
study dealt with the appropriateness of a non-custodial sentence imposed
at trial. These cases are a useful lens through which to examine the degree
to which appellate courts are taking such violence seriously. Because cases
involving Indigenous offenders raise unique issues requiring appellate courts
to reconcile s 718.2(a)(ii) and s 718.2(e), these cases warrant particular
attention and will be examined in more detail.
Finding the right balance between custodial and non- custodial sentences
in the context of MIPVW is particularly challenging because non-custodial
sentences often mean putting the offender back into the same community,
and sometimes even the same home, as the victim. Given the prevalence
of penitentiary sentences in these cases, it is notable that 19, or almost
23%, of the appellate decisions actually dealt with the appropriateness of a
non-custodial sentence.49 In 11 appellate cases, spanning almost the entire
timeframe of the study, appellate courts overturned a non-custodial sentence
imposed at trial and substituted a period of imprisonment. 50 In eight cases,
an appellate court upheld or imposed a non-custodial sentence, although
several of these cases were defence appeals where the accused was seeking a
more lenient form of non-custodial sentence. 51 While the outcomes suggest
49 "Non-custodial" refers to cases in which either a discharge, suspended sentence
with probation or a CSO was imposed. While a CSO is technically a term of imprisonment,
the offender is allowed to serve his sentence in the community. It is important to acknowledge
that in some of these cases, the offender had served time in custody prior to trial.
50 R v Smith, 123 OAC 228, [1999] OJ No 2694 (CA) [Smith ONCA]; R c Berube,
215 NBR (2d) 341, 551 APR 341 (CA) [Berube]; R v Smith, 1999 BCCA 747, 141 CCC (3d)
421 [Smith BCCA]; R v MacDonald, 2003 NSCA 36, 12 CR (6th) 99 [MacDonald NSCA];
R c Chemnier, 2004 CanLII 35643, 191 CCC (3d) 512 (Qc CA) [Chenier]; Morris, supra note
37; R v Pudlat, 2005 NUCA 3, 404 AR 389 [Pudlat]; Coulthard, supra note 34; Woods, supra
note 35; R v GGS, 2016 MBCA 109, 2016 CarswellMan 489 (WL Can) [GGS]; R c Beaulieu,
2013 QCCA 208, JE 2013-309 [Beaulieu] (where the Court of Appeal overturned a CSO and
imposed a period of imprisonment to be served intermittently).
51 R v JCT, 1998 CanLII 17661, 124 CCC (3d) 385 (Ont CA) [JCT]; R v Reid, 2002
BCCA 268, 168 BCAC 107 [Reid]; R v Brown, 2004 NSCA 51, 222 NSR (2d) 393 [Brown
2004]; R vEtuangat, 2009 NUCA 1,457 AR 172 [Etuangat]; R v Olson, 2011 BCCA 8, 300
BCAC 288 [Olson]; R c Moisan, 2012 QCCA 2197, 2012 CarswellQue 13045 (WL Can)
[Moisan]; Beaulieu, supra note 50; R v TEC, 2015 BCCA 43, 366 BCAC 288 [TEC]; R c
Garneau, 2005 QCCA 969,2005 CarswellQue 9348 (WL Can) [Garneau].
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that appellate courts treat non-custodial sentences as exceptional, no clear
or consistent criteria have developed around what might warrant such an
exception. Of course, s 718.2(a)(ii) is not the only factor contributing to the
sentences in these cases. The presence or absence of a history of violence,
prospects for rehabilitation and other aggravating and mitigating factors
must be balanced with s 718.2(a) (ii).
1) Upholding Non-Custodial Sentences
Overall, appellate courts have hesitated to impose non-custodial sentences.
Four of the six cases in which an appellate court upheld a non-custodial
sentence for a non-Indigenous offender were defence appeals where the
offender was asking for a more lenient form of non-custodial sentence
and the appellate court dismissed the appeal.52 One Crown appeal from
a suspended sentence resulted in a more onerous CSO being imposed on
appeal. 53 Outside of the cases dealing with Indigenous offenders, there was
only one case in which an appellate court dismissed a Crown appeal of a
non-custodial sentence where the Crown was seeking a custodial sentence.
In R v ]CT, one of the first sentence appeals following the coming into force
of s 718.2(a)(ii), the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a CSO of 18 months
for an offender who was convicted of sexual assault, assault, criminal
harassment and several breaches of conditions.54 The sexual assault charge
involved nonconsensual intercourse, a fact that often leads courts to impose
penitentiary time. The Court of Appeal was influenced by the fact that the
offender had recently lived through the deaths of multiple loved ones and
that expert evidence strongly supported a community-based disposition.
This decision does not mention whether the Crown proceeded by summary
conviction or by indictment, but it is notable that a CSO is no longer available
for sexual assault or criminal harassment where the Crown proceeds by
indictment.55 As will be discussed below, it is no coincidence that this
outlier case with respect to non-custodial sentences on appeal involved a
sexual assault, the one crime for which courts have failed to consistently
respond harshly to intimate violence.
2) Overturning Non-Custodial Sentences
Appellate courts have stressed the importance of denunciation and
deterrence when overturning non-custodial sentences imposed at trial.
The willingness of appellate courts to jump from non-custodial sentences
52 TEC, supra note 51; Brown 2004, supra note 51; Olson, supra note 51; Moisan,
supra note 51.
53 Garneau, supra note 51.
54 Supra note 51.
55 Code, supra note 3, ss 742.1(f)(ii), 742.1(f)(iii).
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imposed at trial to penitentiary sentences on appeal demonstrates the
shift to treating intimate violence more seriously, but also the potential
egregious nature of the sentences imposed at trial.56 These cases suggest that
s 718.2(a)(ii) plays an important role in providing appellate courts a tool
with which to overturn inappropriate non-custodial sentences. In R v Smith,
for example, the trial judge imposed a nine-month CSO for a man convicted
of six counts involving violence against his wife, including two counts of
assault causing bodily harm.57 The trial judge described the offender as
someone with no previous record despite the fact that the offences against
his wife took place over a seven-year period. The Ontario Court of Appeal
held that the non-custodial sentence was inappropriate and highlighted the
fact that this violence was ongoing over a considerable period of time, and
thus the focus on the absence of a criminal record by the trial judge was
misplaced.
In replacing a suspended sentence with two years of incarceration, the
New Brunswick Court of Appeal has also made strong statements about the
appropriate approach to sentencing for MIPVW:
Le debat est cos sur le sujet: les tribunaux doivent tre particulirement sensibles
aux probl~mes de la violence conjugale et de la violence familiale, et ils doivent
exprimer an moyen de sanctions suffisamment sevres l'intolerance de la societ6 A
lendroit de ces violences.
I're de la tolerance pour la violence conjugale est revolue depuis belle lurette. I1
appartient aux tribunaux de se mettre an diapason de sorte A tre en harmonie avec
les attitudes modernes sur la question. Ces attitudes sont incarnees dans le sous-al.
718.2a) (ii) (sic) du Code.58
Many of these cases involved very serious crimes and the non-custodial
sentences imposed at trial are particularly difficult to understand. For
example, in a case also called R v Smith, the trial judge had imposed a
suspended sentence on an offender who had smuggled a firearm and
ammunition into Canada and attempted to shoot his ex-spouse and her
brother.59 Fortunately, the weapon jammed and no one was injured.60 The
British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed a sentence
56 GGS, supra note 50; Chenier, supra note 50; Brube, supra note 50; Pudlat, supra
note 50.
57 Smith ONCA, supra note 50.
58 Brube, supra note 50 at paras 21 22. See also Chenier, supra note 50 (where the
offender was given a CSO after breaking into the victim's residence at night, threatening her
and attempting to strangle her in front of her son; and the Quebec Court of Appeal imposed
a federal sentence of 30 months, relying on s 718.2(a) (ii)).
59 Smith BCCA, supra note 50 at paras 9, 4.
60 Ibid at para 4.
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of two years' incarceration. 61 In R v Coulthard, the offender, wearing a mask,
hid in his ex-girlfriend's apartment building and attacked her from behind.62
She was pregnant and had refused to have an abortion. 63 The Alberta Court
of Appeal held that a CSO of two years less a day was unfit because of the
trial judge's failure to give adequate weight to deterrence and denunciation
and to "review the factors in s. 718.2 (a) to (e)."64 Denunciation and general
deterrence "cannot be overtaken by an offender's individual circumstances
or the need for rehabilitation."65
Sentencing judges have a particularly difficult task where the victim is
urging a non-custodial sentence in circumstances where the seriousness of
the offence appears to demand otherwise. There is by no means a uniform
position on how to deal with such submissions. On the one hand, the
victims testimony should be listened to and taken seriously. On the other
hand, courts must be scrupulous about whether a particular woman is
under pressure or has been threatened with respect to such testimony.
These cases raise the tension between the historical view that violence
within the family is private and a matter of individual choice, on the one
hand, and the view that courts have a responsibility to protect women from
violence regardless of the victims wishes, on the other. In R v MacDonald,
for example, MacDonald had beaten his common-law partner with a clothes
iron and a wine bottle while in a drunken rage. 66 He had a history of violence
against her.67 The victim made a plea for leniency, blaming herself for the
violence against her and telling the Court she would not want to live if she
were separated from the offender.68 The trial judge was influenced by this
plea and imposed a two-year CSO for aggravated assault even though the
CSO would mean that the couple would continue to cohabitate.69 The Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal, in imposing a sentence of two years' incarceration,
stressed that the victims plea for leniency underscored "the extent of her
vulnerability and dependence upon Mr. MacDonald. One wonders if she
is able to fairly evaluate the relationship and the dangers that it creates for
her.70 Because the couple was planning to resume cohabitation during the
CSO, the Court of Appeal was concerned that there were no conditions that
could be imposed that would protect the victim's safety.71
61 Ibid at para 28.
62 Supra note 34 at paras 1 2.
63 Ibid at para 2.
64 Ibid at para 8.
65 Ibid at para 9.
66 MacDonald NSCA, supra note 50 at para 2.
67 Ibid at para 12.
68 Ibid at para 42.
69 Ibid at para 3.
7o Ibid at para 43.
71 Ibid at para 35.
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These cases demonstrate that while some trial judges are still imposing
non-custodial sentences for very violent offences of MIPVW, appellate
courts are reluctant to uphold such sentences on Crown appeals. The
mechanism for so doing is to use s 718.2(a)(ii) to shift the focus to deterrence
and denunciation. It would be helpful to have more guidance about when
non-custodial sentences are appropriate, as these appellate decisions fail to
provide guidance for future cases.
3) Non-Custodial Sentences for Indigenous Offenders
Additional factors come into play when courts are sentencing an Indigenous
offender for crimes involving MIPVW. In this section, the paper addresses
sentencing Indigenous men for violence against their female intimate
partners. While it is impossible to identify precisely how many of the women
involved in these cases were themselves Indigenous, the circumstances of
the cases suggest that a significant number of them were.
Assessing the appropriateness of a non-custodial sentence is more
complicated in cases dealing with Indigenous offenders because courts
must reconcile s 718.2(a)(ii) with the important direction of s 718.2(e) to
consider all options other than incarceration when sentencing Indigenous
offenders. Courts are faced with reconciling a particularly high level of
intimate violence against Indigenous women with the need to reduce the
over-incarceration of Indigenous men. Section 718.2(a)(ii) demands that
denunciation and deterrence prevail when dealing with IPV, which usually
means a custodial sentence is required. Section 718.2(e), by contrast, calls
for more restorative and rehabilitative approaches to sentencing.72
The appellate cases on s 718.2(a)(ii) do not provide much guidance on
how these two provisions can been reconciled. Overall, the cases suggest
that judges choose which section to prioritize in a particular case, focusing
on factors such as the degree of violence involved and the extent to which
Gladue factors have negatively impacted the accused. 73 The more difficult
task of somehow reconciling both of these important provisions is less
commonly undertaken, and sometimes the fact that these cases involve
MIPVW disappears from the analysis. 74
72 Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, "Gladue: The Judicial and Political Reception of a
Promising Decision" (2000) 42:3 Can J Crim 355 at 356 58.
73 In this paper, I refer to "Gladue factors" to describe the background factors a court
must consider under s 718.2(e) that are described by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v
Gladue, supra note 40.
74 For example, the larger study also examined 122 appellate cases involving MIPVW
that did not mention s 718.2(a)(ii). Indigenous offenders were overrepresented in this group
of cases at a higher rate with 16% of these cases involving Indigenous offenders: Grant,
"Sentencing for IPV", supra note 4 at 15.
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It is important to put these cases in context. Indigenous women are more
than three times more likely to report victimization by a spouse or common-
law partner than non-Indigenous women 75 and are eight times more likely
to be killed by their intimate partner than are non-Indigenous women.76
MIPVW has had a devastating impact on many Indigenous communities
and has been linked to the legacy of colonialism and residential schools. 77
Indigenous women in remote communities face additional barriers to
reporting MIPVW and to accessing support services. 78
Some feminist scholars have expressed concern about the use of
restorative justice when dealing with MIPVW in Indigenous communities. 79
Jane Dickson-Gilmore notes how restorative responses to violence against
women have promised much but have thus far been unable to "deliver good
solutions or free women and children from violence."80 Angela Cameron
argues that restorative justice processes in the context of judicially convened
sentencing circles in Indigenous communities have failed to account
for the inequality of women within these communities and the inherent
power imbalance between abusers and survivors, thus perpetuating "the
intersecting oppressions experienced by Aboriginal women who are
survivors of intimate violence."81 These scholars do not necessarily endorse
the response of our existing criminal justice system to violence against
Indigenous women, but rather raise cautions about the intersection of sex
and Indigeneity in relying on restorative principles. Other feminist scholars
argue that it is misguided to think that punitive sentences for male offenders
will protect Indigenous women. Debra Parkes and David Milward, for
75 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada, 2014, supra note 27 at 15.
76 Kimberley G Zorn et al, "Perspectives on Regional Differences and Intimate
Partner Violence in Canada: A Qualitative Examination" (2017) 32:6 J Family Violence 633
at 634 [Zorn et al].
77 Cameron, supra note 7 at 493 94. Some Indigenous communities have taken
steps to address MIPVW through their own practices and laws. See e.g. Michael Bopp, Judie
Bopp & Phil Lane Jr, Aboriginal Domestic Violence in Canada (Ottawa: Aboriginal Healing
Foundation, 2003) at 73 78; Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission,
Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Manitoba: Government of Manitoba,
1999) vol 1, ch 13.
78 Zorn et al, supra note 76 at 634.
79 See Dickson-Gilmore, supra note 7.
80 Ibid at 419.
81 Cameron, supra note 7 at 483. See also Gillian Balfour & Janice Du Mont,
"Confronting Restorative Justice in Neo-Liberal Times: Legal and Rape Narratives and
Conditional Sentencing" in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal
Practice and Womens Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2012) 701 at 703 [Balfour
& Du Mont, "Confronting Restorative Justice"]; Joanne Belknap & Courtney McDonald,
"Judges' Attitudes about and Experiences with Sentencing Circles in Intimate-Partner Abuse
Cases" (2010) 52:4 Can J Corr 369; Rashmi Goel, "No Women at the Center: The Use of the
Canadian Sentencing Circle in Domestic Violence Cases" (2000) 15:2 Wis Womens LJ 293.
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example, argue that what Indigenous women want is safety from violence-
not the incarceration of their male partners.8 2
There is no question that Canada faces a very serious problem of the
over-incarceration of Indigenous men and women, an ongoing problem
despite the efforts of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Gladue8 3 and R v
Ipeelee.8 4 Some of the cases described in this paper predate the decision in
Ipeelee, where the Court made clear that Gladue principles apply to all crimes,
including the most serious, and clarified that there is no requirement that the
offender prove a causal connection between the impact of colonialism and
his criminality.8 5 The Ipeelee Court did require that there be a connection
between the Gladue factors and the particular offender before the application
of s 718.2(e): "Unless the unique circumstances of the particular offender
bear on his or her culpability for the offence or indicate which sentencing
objectives can and should be actualized, they will not influence the ultimate
sentence" 8 6 This passage has been used by subsequent appellate courts to
somewhat weaken the impact of Ipeelee.8 7 In the context of MIPVW, for
example, courts are sometimes willing to impose harsher sentences because
the offender has not struggled with drug or alcohol addiction.88
Section 718.2(e) was amended in 2015 by the Harper government
to explicitly require that consideration also be given to the harm caused
to the victim and to the community.8 9 Thus far, courts do not appear to
have changed their approach to s 718.2(e) on the basis of this amendment,
possibly because judges were already taking these factors into account. 90
The appellate cases indicate that the degree to which the individual
offender has been impacted by Gladue factors himself is perhaps the most
significant determinant of how s 718.2(a)(ii) and s 718.2(e) will be applied
82 David Milward & Debra Parkes, "Colonialism, Systemic Discrimination, and the
Crisis of Indigenous Over-incarceration: Challenges of Reforming the Sentencing Process:'
in Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender/Sexuality Connections, 3rd ed
(Toronto: Brunswick Books, 2014) at 136.
83 Supra note 40.
84 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433 [Ipeelee].
85 Ibid at paras 81 87.
86 Ibid at para 83.
87 R v Fraser, 2016 ONCA 745 at para 21, 33 CR (7th) 205 [Fraser]; see also R v
Chanalquay, 2015 SKCA 141, 472 Sask R 110 (a case not involving MIPVW).
88 Fraser, supra note 87 at para 25; Morris, supra note 37 at para 18.
89 Code, supra note 3.
90 See e.g. R vRJN, 2016 YKTC 55,2016 CarswellYukon 130 (WL Can) (in imposing
a CSO for sexual assault, the Court mentioned that the provisions of s 718.2 seem to conflict
with each other but did not discuss the change to s 718.2(e)); R v Creighton, 2016 ABPC 83,
2016 CarswellAlta 688 (WL Can) (where there was no discussion of the revised wording of s
718.2(e) in an aggravated assault case).
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together. Other influential factors include the degree to which the offender's
community is able to provide the necessary resources to support the
offender in the community91 and whether the victim opposes having the
offender back in the community.92 It is important to note that there can
be considerable pressure on women to agree to participate in community-
based dispositions for their abusers. Power dynamics within the particular
Indigenous community may well have a gendered dimension that makes
it difficult for women to refuse to participate or to express their fear of the
offender.
The courts have struggled to determine when a non-custodial sentence
is uniquely appropriate for an Indigenous offender in the context of MIPVW
In R v Reid, the offender was convicted of aggravated assault against his
former wife.93 He had stabbed her three times and kicked and beaten her,
apparently because she had been associating with other men. 94 While he
immediately showed some remorse and let her go to the hospital, he also
threatened more violence if she disclosed his involvement in the attack.95 He
had a history of assault against the victim, as well as against another former
spouse, and a record of breaching conditions. 96 The trial judge imposed
a three-year custodial sentence and the Court of Appeal overturned that
sentence and imposed a CSO.97 The Court of Appeal indicated that three
years would have been a fit sentence but for new evidence before it about
the resources available to support a CSO in the offender's Indigenous
community and the fact that the victim no longer opposed a community-
based sentence, although she had in the past.98 The Court of Appeal gave the
most weight to the fact that the offender had apparently given up alcohol.99
It is unusual for someone convicted of aggravated assault, with a history
of violence against two women and a history of breaching conditions, to
receive a non-custodial sentence. Subsequent amendments to the Code
preclude a CSO for aggravated assault, although a suspended sentence is still
technically available. It was clearly s 718.2(e) and the availability of support
in the offender's community that made the difference in Reid.
91 See e.g. R v TC, 2009 SKCA 124, 343 Sask R 182 [TC]; Etuangat, supra note 51.
92 TC, supra note 91; Etuangat, supra note 51.
93 Supra note 51 at para 1.
94 Ibid at para 4.
95 Ibid at para 5.
96 Ibid at para 9.
97 Ibid at para 37.
98 Ibid at paras 28 29.
99 Ibid at para 28; although the only evidence to this effect was the statement of
defence counsel.
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The Nunavut Court of Appeal upheld a suspended sentence in a context
where a more punitive CSO had been rejected by the judge because the
offender would not be able to comply with the conditions attached to a
CSO. In R v Etuangat, the offender had assaulted his spouse, punching her
in the head repeatedly while she was carrying their baby on her back.100
The sentencing judge had not mentioned either s 718.2(e) or s 718.2(a)(ii)
in his reasons for sentence. While the Court of Appeal did talk about the
importance of deterring domestic violence, s 718.2(e) took the Court in
another direction given the offender's difficult background, his problems
with alcohol and the fact that he was prepared to go to a treatment
program. 10 1 The Court indicated the outcome would have been different
if his history of assault had been against the same victim, although did not
explain why.10 2 Nor did the Court indicate how the offender's inability to
comply with the conditions of a CSO gave it confidence that he could comply
with the conditions of probation attached to the suspended sentence.
Appellate courts are less likely to uphold non-custodial sentences for
Indigenous offenders where the negative impact of Gladue factors has been
less significant for the accused and where the violence was particularly
serious. In R v Morris, the offender had been convicted of uttering threats,
assault, pointing a firearm and forcible confinement. 10 3 After finding his
common-law wife and her male friend sleeping in her car, he forced her to
drive to a secluded location where he threw her to the ground and beat her
over the course of two hours. 104 During this attack, she acquiesced to sexual
intercourse with him to calm him down, although he was not charged with
sexual assault. 105
Morris had been a Band Councillor with the Laird First Nation for three
years and Chief for six years. 10 6 A psychological report indicated that he
had a "high risk for future spousal violence' and a low risk for other violent
offending. 10 7 The trial judge had imposed a suspended sentence with
probation in part because he felt incarceration might deter women from
coming forward in the community.10 8 What was unusual about this case is
that the Laird Aboriginal Women's Society wrote a letter to Crown counsel
outlining its concerns about the involvement of the Kaska Tribal Council
given the offender's position as Chief:
100 Supra note 51 at para 8.
101 Ibid at paras 33 36.
102 Ibid at para 37.
103 Supra note 37 at para 1.
104 Ibid at paras 9 11.
105 Ibid at para 11.
106 Ibid at para 16.
107 Ibid at para 21.
108 Ibid at para 35.
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Kaska women fear that the decision makers within these political offices are too
close to the issue to maintain objectivity. Furthermore, Kaska women fear that
the Aboriginal Leadership will use their power and authority to retaliate against
those who find the courage to speak out against violence. Kaska women fear that
the political leadership and their involvement in this case will only serve to further
ostracize, isolate and subject our families to further oppression. 1 09
The Court of Appeal overturned the non-custodial sentence and imposed
12 months' incarceration plus probation because the crime had been so
serious and because the offender had not been directly impacted by Gladue
factors. The Court was clearly concerned about the message the trial judge's
sentence would send:
In my view, the suspended sentence and probation order is unfit because it sends
a completely wrong message to the victim, the offender and the community. An
incident of brutal spousal abuse by this offender, in the context of a community
where spousal abuse is epidemic, and victims are intimidated, clearly called for a
sentence that provided some deterrence in a general sense, and more importantly
perhaps, denunciation of the conduct. In my view, a term of incarceration is required
to give effect to these objectives. 1 10
The Court stressed the "toxic atmosphere" in the community relating to the
epidemic of spousal abuse and the divisions within the community based
on gender and political lines.11I Morris is a somewhat unusual case because
the Crown made a significant effort to bring violence against women to the
Court's attention. Morris highlights the Crown's role in putting violence
against Indigenous women in context for the court. Community impact
statements, outlined in s 722.2 of the Code, enacted in 2015, could be
one mechanism for doing this, although attention needs to be paid to the
question of who speaks for the community and to recognizing the gendered
nature of the power structure in some communities. Just as it is important
to have Gladue reports before the court in sentencing, it is the job of Crown
counsel to contextualize the impact of the violence experienced by the
victim and by the women in her community.
A recent Manitoba Court of Appeal decision demonstrates an attempt
to acknowledge the significance of both s 718.2(a)(ii) and s 718.2(e). In R v
GGS, the offender had nonconsensual anal intercourse with his spouse, who
was recovering from childbirth and had declined sexual activity with him
just prior to the assault.112 The offender burned her back with a lighter twice
109 Ibid at para 27.
110 Ibidatpara62.
111 Ibidatpara67.
112 Supra note 50 at para 4.
[Vol. 96
2018] The Role of Section 718.2(a) (i) in Sentencing for Male ... 181
and tied her to the crib where her baby was sleeping 1 3 He was convicted
of sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.114 The trial judge
had imposed a suspended sentence with probation and had given significant
weight to the (mistaken) information provided by Crown counsel that none
of the offender's previous convictions for domestic violence had related to
the same victim. 115
In stark contrast to the suspended sentence, the Court of Appeal held
that a sentence of six years would have been appropriate in this case, but
ultimately imposed a sentence of 48 months less pretrial custody, largely
on the basis of the very significant Gladue factors. The offender had been
physically and sexually abused while at a residential school and his family
had been gravely affected by alcohol-related problems. The Court of Appeal
declined to stay the newly imposed custodial portion of the sentence, despite
the offender's efforts towards rehabilitation, noting that the offences were
particularly demeaning and degrading to the victim.
None of these judgments provides guidance for future trial judges
trying to reconcile two statutory sentencing provisions that can point courts
in different directions. Instead, appellate courts appear to give more weight
to one provision over the other, depending on the facts of the case, although
the reasons for such a preference are rarely explicit. Overall, the cases
demonstrate the challenges of attempting to deal with systemic inequalities
like MIPVW and over-incarceration through the vehicle of a sentencing
process that is designed to focus only on the individual accused and his
victim(s). This is especially true in communities where woefully inadequate
resources are available both for women to safely escape violence and for
offenders to be reintegrated into the community.
B) Sentencing for Male Intimate Partner Sexual Violence
Against Women
Most of the non-custodial cases discussed above suggest that appellate
courts are taking MIPVW seriously and do not demonstrate a pattern of
minimizing the seriousness of this violence. A close reading of the sexual
assault cases, by contrast, reveals problematic reasoning most often in the
trial decisions underlying the appeal, but sometimes also at the appellate
level. These cases suggest that some trial judges still fail to recognize that
male intimate partner sexual violence against women ("MIPSVW") is
at least as serious as other sexual assaults, if not more so. While appellate
113 Ibid.
114 Ibidatparal.
115 In fact, the accused had convictions for violence against this victim both before
and after the incident in question. Ibid at para 2.
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courts often say the right thing about the intimate relationship not being
a mitigating factor, sentences significantly below the range are sometimes
imposed without any explanation of why the case falls below the lower end
of the range. Additionally, sentences are sometimes reduced on the basis that
the woman continued in the relationship or agreed to have sexual relations
with the offender at some point after the sexual assault(s) in question. This
problem is most evident in cases involving the lowest level of sexual assault,
referred to as level I. In the small number of cases involving sexual assault
causing bodily harm or aggravated sexual assault, judges took the violence
more seriously.
Unlike intimate violence generally, the rate of intimate partner sexual
violence reported to police increased by 15% between 2010 and 2015 in
Canada, and is 36 times higher for women than for men. 116 One stereotype
that exists about MIPSVW is that it is less damaging to its victims than
other forms of sexual assault because the complainant has already been
involved in a sexual relationship with the man in question. In fact, research
demonstrates that MIPSVW has a particularly devastating impact on its
victims because it is often repeated over months or even years and because
of the profound breach of trust involved:
Compared to survivors of non-partner sexual violence, survivors of [intimate
partner sexual violence ("IPSV")] experience longer lasting trauma, higher levels
of physical injury, higher incidences of multiple sexual assaults, and an increased
likelihood of violence resulting in pregnancy and deliberate exposure to sexually
transmitted infections. In addition, women who experience IPSV are also more
likely to be killed by their intimate partner. 117
What few studies there are on this subject suggest that lower sentences are
traditionally given for MIPSVW than for stranger sexual assaults.1 18
It is perhaps not surprising that it is in the context of our most gendered
crime that we see the greatest resistance to change and the endurance of
116 Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2015, by Marta
Burczycka & Shana Conroy, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 16 February
2017) at 48.
117 Linda Baker, Nicole Etherington & Elsa Baratto "Intimate Partner Sexual Violence'
(2016) 17 Centre for Research & Education on Violence Against Women & Children,
Learning Network, online: <http://www.vawlearningnetwork.ca/issue-17-intimate-partner-
sexual-violence> [endnotes omitted].
118 See the studies cited in Du Mont, Parnis & Forte, "Judicial Sentencing in IPV
Sexual Assault Cases", supra note 1 at 141.
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myths about the violence women experience.'1 19 The literature suggests that
CSOs have been used more often for sexual assault than for other violent
crimes.1 20 The overreliance on CSOs in sentencing for sexual assault 121 was
one factor leading Parliament to make CSOs unavailable for sexual assault
where the Crown proceeds by indictment.1 22
There were 17 appellate cases (21%) that included charges of sexual
assault, comprised of one case involving aggravated sexual assault, three
cases involving sexual assault with a weapon/causing bodily harm and 13
cases involving level I sexual assaults. There were also at least four cases
where sexual assault charges were either dropped by the Crown or the
offender was acquitted of that charge and convicted of other offences.1 23
There were no cases involving sexual assault committed by women against
their male intimate partners. The Crown appeals in this context probably
reveal some of the most egregious sentences imposed for MIPSVW at trial,
and thus this sample may not be representative of trial courts generally. But
also invisible are the cases where charges are never laid or the accused is
acquitted based on stereotypes around women's perpetual state of consent
in intimate relationships.
Appellate courts consistently take the position that nonconsensual
intercourse is a particularly serious form of sexual assault, yet in the spousal
context, some of these cases are not treated with the seriousness that courts
say they deserve. In R v RG, for example, the offender was convicted of sexual
assault for nonconsensual intercourse with his wife.124 The Newfoundland
and Labrador Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of six months with
probation.1 25 The trial judge stressed that the couple had continued to
cohabitate and to have consensual sexual relations after the sexual assault
and before ultimately ending the relationship. The trial judge also held that
it was mitigating that the sexual assault was "more for sexual gratification
as opposed to violence towards the victim." 126 The Court of Appeal agreed
119 Holly Johnson, "Limits of a Criminal Justice Response: Trends in Police and Court
Processing of Sexual Assault" in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, SexualAssault in Canada: Law, Legal
Practice and Women's Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 613 at 613.
120 Statistics Canada, Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends 2006, by
Holly Johnson, Catalogue No 85-570-XIE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006) at 53.
121 Balfour & Du Mont, "Confronting Restorative Justice", supra note 81.
122 Code, supra note 3, s 742.1(f)(iii).
123 R v DD, 2006 QCCA 1323, 221 CCC (3d) 57 (offender acquitted of sexual assault
charge); R v DNM, 1999 BCCA 420, 128 BCAC 86 (sexual assault charge was stayed); R v
McIntosh, 2004 NSCA 19, 697 APR 147 (sexual assault charge was dismissed for want of
evidence); TEC, supra note 51 (offender acquitted of sexual assault).
124 2003 NLCA 73 at para 2, 232 Nfld & PEIR 273.
125 Ibid at para 20.
126 Ibid at para 5.
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with the Crown that it is wrong in principle to treat sentencing differently
for MIPSVW. However, it agreed with the trial judge that, in this case, the
fact that she had stayed with the offender was mitigating despite the fact that
the statement of facts indicated that the victim did not know that a husband
could be charged for sexually assaulting his wife.127 The notion that sexual
assault is just about sexual gratification when the victim is an intimate
partner of the accused, and not power and control, is a particularly insidious
stereotype because it trivializes the harm of MIPSVW as compared to other
sexual assaults and makes it more difficult for this group of women to come
forward.
The suggestion that MIPSVW is somehow less culpable than stranger
sexual assaults found some support in the Newfoundland and Labrador
Court of Appeal in Squires, although it did not carry the day.128 Justice Welsh,
writing the majority reasons on other grounds, stated that the starting-
point sentence for sexual assault involving forced intercourse outside of
an intimate relationship should be three years, whereas the starting point
within an intimate relationship should be 18 months-explicitly creating
a discount for MIPSVW Justice Welsh went on to list relevant factors in
crafting a sentence for MIPSVW, which included whether the victim
agreed to have sex with the offender after the sexual assault and whether
the relationship was otherwise abusive, as if sexual assault does not itself
make a relationship abusive. Justice Rowe (as he then was) wrote concurring
minority reasons to urge the Court not to deal with the starting-point issue,
and there was a strong dissenting judgment by Hoegg JA demonstrating
why the judgment of Welsh JA was so problematic and why it contradicted
the legislative intent behind s 718.2 (a) (ii).
Setting a lower range of sentence for sexual assaults with intercourse that occur
within an ongoing relationship is a statement that those assaults are less serious
than sexual assaults with intercourse that are committed upon complainants who
are not in ongoing relationships. This message directly contradicts the intention of
Parliament, stands in direct opposition to much recent jurisprudence, and sends a
message to this distinct group of complainants that they are less worthy of the law's
protection than other complainants. 
12 9
The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal has since repudiated the
position of Welsh JA, noting that only one judge in Squires had supported a
lower starting point.130 However, the intimate-partner discount can be seen
(more subtly) in other cases. In Woods, the offender, jealous about rumours
127 Ibid at para 14.
128 Squires, supra note 31.
129 Ibid at para 105.
130 R vBranton, 2013 NLCA 61,341 Nfld & PEIR 329.
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that his partner was seeing another man, had nonconsensual intercourse
with her in a particularly demeaning fashion. 131 This violence continued
over "some considerable time" before he fell asleep. 132 The following day,
she agreed to have sexual intercourse with him because, as she testified, "I
had to let him because I didn't want to get hurt by him again."133 The trial
judge commented that the victim could not have been "profoundly shaken"
by the sexual assault or she would not have had sexual intercourse with
him the next day, and used this logic to justify a CSO of two years less a
day. 134 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal began its analysis by referring
to "a well-established line of authority from this Court which indicates that
the appropriate starting point sentence for a major or serious sexual assault
is three years of imprisonment."1 35 The Court held that the trial judge erred
in allowing the accused to serve the sentence in the community but upheld
the sentence of two years less a day with no explanation for going below the
three-year starting point. The Court offered no condemnation of the trial
judge's approach, leaving the impression that it was the lack of a profound
impact on the victim that justified the lower sentence or that this simply was
not a major or serious sexual assault.
Two recent appellate decisions demonstrate that the trend towards
lower sentences at trial for MIPSVW continues and that s 718.2(a)(ii) is
important in correcting those cases on appeal. In R v DJA, the trial judge
imposed 12 months plus probation for a man who had nonconsensual anal
intercourse on his common-law partner.136 The offender had a record of
violent offences including violence against former spouses. 137 The very
brief reasons of the trial judge gave no explanation for why the sentence was
so discrepant with authorities. The Alberta Court of Appeal increased the
sentence to four years' incarceration, noting that the trial judge's sentence
minimized and trivialized the very serious sexual assault involved and
treated the starting point for major sexual assaults as something that could
be "swept off the sentencing table."1 38
In GGS, discussed above in the context of s 718.2(e), the trial judge
imposed a suspended sentence for an offender who tied his common-law
partner to her infant's crib, burned her with a lighter and anally raped her.139
Despite the violent nature of the offences and the offender's history ofviolence,
131 Woods, supra note 35 at para 8.
132 Ibid at para 9.
133 Ibid at para 10.
134 Ibid at para 26.
135 Ibid at para 30.
136 2016 ABCA 282 at para 2, 2016 CarswellAlta 1826 (WL Can).
137 Ibid at para 8.
138 Ibid at para 10, citing R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363 at para 279, 499 AR 1.
139 Supra note 50 at para 4.
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the trial judge characterized the incident as "a spontaneous act of violence
between two people involved in an ongoing intimate relationship"' 140 and
stressed that there was no evidence that this offence was "part of a cycle or
pattern of violence on the part of the accused."1 41 While the trial judge had
been given incorrect information about his history of violence against this
particular victim, she was aware of the fact that the offender had a history
of violence against female partners. The Court of Appeal held that a six-
year sentence would have been appropriate but reduced it to four years on
the basis of Gladue.142 The jump from a suspended sentence imposed at
trial to a four-year penitentiary sentence highlights the egregiousness of the
suspended sentence imposed at trial and the degree to which the trial judge
was out of touch with sentencing for MIPSVW
Remnants of stereotypes about intimate violence such as "why didn't
she leave the relationship" or "would she have consented to have sex with
him later if she had really been sexually assaulted" can still be found in
these cases in a way that is not seen with nonsexual offences. This study
suggests that, while appellate courts may have overcome many of these
problematic assumptions in the context of nonsexual offences, these views
still linger when dealing with male sexual violence. Appellate courts may set
ranges or starting points for major sexual assaults that involve significant
penitentiary time, but they are not consistently applied by trial judges or
even appellate courts in the context of MIPSVW. The idea that sexual
assault within a relationship is only about sexual gratification trivializes the
violence involved and its devastating impact on its female victims. The fact
that the victim stays in the relationship, or feels compelled to have sex with
the offender on another occasion, has nothing to do with the culpability of
the offender for the prior sexual assault(s).
4. Conclusion
The cases reviewed in this paper suggest that appellate courts are generally
taking MIPVW seriously, at least for those cases that get to the sentencing
stage. Outside of the sexual assault context, there were almost no cases where
questions were raised about why the woman did not leave the relationship
or suggestions that she was responsible for bringing the violence on herself.
Male violence against women was not treated as something that was in the
private sphere of the family, but rather as something that should be strongly
denounced through the sentencing process.
140 Ibid at para 11.
141 Ibid at para 29.
142 See ibid at para 60.
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By contrast, stereotypes about intimate violence were more prevalent
in the context of sexual assault, particularly at the trial level. In the context
of sexual violence, myths about women who stay in abusive relationships
linger. Would she have stayed if he had really sexually assaulted her? Would
she have consented to subsequent sexual intercourse if the previous incident
had been nonconsensual? These stereotypes are operating subtly because the
fact of conviction should have settled the non-consent issue. The message
in these cases is that sexual assault within an intimate relationship is less
serious than outside of such relationships. This is particularly true for level
I sexual assaults. It is only where cases involve considerably more violence,
beyond that inherent in the sexual assault, that courts seem to grasp the
seriousness of these offences. More needs to be done by judges, Crown and
defence counsel, at the trial level and on appeal, to avoid stereotypes about
whether it was "a real sexual assault" and to acknowledge the insidious harm
done by MIPSVW 143 The sexual assault cases in this study demonstrate the
ongoing need for a statutory aggravating factor such as s 718.2(a) (ii).
One important function of s 718.2(a)(ii) may be as a tool for appellate
courts to correct the most egregious trial-level sentencing decisions. For
example, when s 718.2(e) shifts the focus to restorative principles, it is
important to have a statutory provision that at least brings the seriousness of
MIPVW at least back into the discussion. The primary function of s 718.2(a)
(ii) is to give statutory force to the interpretive principle that denunciation
and deterrence should be the primary principles in sentencing for MIPVW,
unless there are particularly compelling reasons for prioritizing other
sentencing principles. While non-custodial sentences are no longer the
norm, no clear criteria have evolved for determining when a non-custodial
sentence is appropriate. Nor is there any discussion of the remedial purpose
of s 718.2(a)(ii) as a response to the history of trivializing MIPVW and
to the urgent need to protect women from violence. Section 718.2(a)(ii)
is often cited in a cursory way with little discussion beyond saying that it
is aggravating. It is simply added into the mix with other aggravating and
mitigating factors. Sentencing remains a very individualized exercise and
incorporating concerns about systemic sex inequality into an individualized
sentencing calculation is complex and not often attempted. When one adds
the challenge of another systemic inequality through s 718.2(e), the task
becomes even more difficult. The trial decisions underlying some of these
appellate cases clearly suggest that trial judges need more guidance beyond
the somewhat vague instruction of prioritizing deterrence and denunciation.
143 Melanie Randall, "Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and 'Ideal Victims': Consent,
Resistance, and Victim Blaming" (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397 at 409 (where Randall describes how
"wives", like "prostitutes", are presumed to be in a perpetual state of consent); Elaine Craig,
"The Ethical Obligations of Defence Counsel in Sexual Assault Cases" (2014) 51:2 Osgoode
Hall LJ 427.
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Given that overreliance on non-custodial sentences has historically been
a result of the trivialization of MIPVW, it would be easy to assume that longer
sentences, and courts taking this violence more seriously, are the solution to
MIPVW. However, simply locking some men up for longer periods of time
will not bring an end to MIPVW. Sentencing is an after-the-fact response to
violence against women. Many of the offenders in the cases under study had
previously served periods of incarceration that clearly did not deter them
or protect their future partners. Thus, the significance of providing safe and
affordable housing, employment, childcare, effective policing and other
supports to help women extricate themselves from violent relationships
should not be overshadowed by sentencing reform. 144 Having said this,
the criminal justice system response to these cases still has an important
role to play. MIPVW cannot be discounted in the sentencing process as
compared to other forms of violence, such that the intimate relationship
is effectively treated as mitigating. Non-custodial sentences in response to
serious violence do not provide adequate protection for women who are
victims of male violence. Removing these men from the community at least
provides women with some breathing room and the opportunity to try to
reimagine their lives without violence. These cases reveal how devastating
and pervasive MIPVW is for women. When women have the courage to
seek out the criminal justice system, they need to be confident that courts,
and other processes within the criminal justice system, will acknowledge
and denounce this devastation, and do what they can to keep women safe.
144 The proposed new s 718.3 in Bill C-75, supra note 26, would allow a judge to
increase the maximum sentence for an offender convicted of a violent crime against an
intimate partner where he has a prior conviction involving violence against an intimate
partner. While Bill C-75 takes important steps towards treating intimate violence more
seriously, the government has provided no evidence to suggest that judges are unduly
constrained by the existing maximum sentences in the Code. It is not clear why such a
provision is needed given that maximum sentences are almost never imposed for MIPVW
under the current law. Such a provision runs the risk of having a disproportionate impact
on the most marginalized offenders without having a significant impact on sentencing for
intimate violence generally.
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